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Abstract 
 In recent years, many firms have voluntarily taken actions to gradually increase 
the transparency of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. Using data on a 
sample of U.S. firms, this paper empirically examines the factors that encourage firms to 
choose different levels of CSR transparency. This adds to the previous literature that has 
focused only on the binary decision to engage or not to engage in CSR, as opposed to the 
extent and comprehensiveness of voluntary CSR reporting. Environmental transparency 
data are collected from the Roberts Environmental Center (REC) at Claremont McKenna 
College, while data for firm characteristics and toxic releases are collected from Standard 
& Poor‟s Compustat North American and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Robust regression analysis of environmental transparency shows that consumer, investor, 
and community stakeholders significantly increase the level of environmental 
transparency. In addition, environmental transparency is higher among firms that 
compete internationally relative to those with only a domestic presence.  
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I. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), an overarching term for voluntary 
initiatives to take into account environmental and social issues, is increasingly becoming 
an important focus for firms around the world (Reinhardt et al. 2008). In some countries, 
such as Denmark, law requires CSR reporting, but the United States does not have similar 
legislation. Nevertheless, many firms in the United States voluntarily report on internal 
CSR efforts in formal reports or on a company website even though there is no regulatory 
requirement. This study aims to identify firm characteristics, particularly those related to 
financial and environmental performance, that explain the extent of voluntary 
environmental transparency, in the form of CSR reporting, among a sample of U.S. firms. 
 One difficulty with exploring CSR from an empirical perspective stems from the 
range of definitions used throughout the literature. These definitions vary from focusing 
on sacrificing profits to provide social welfare, to social actions by a firm that are not 
required by regulation (Reinhardt et al. 2008; Portney 2008; Lyon and Maxwell 2008). 
For the purpose of this paper, I apply Portney‟s (2008) definition of CSR, “a consistent 
pattern, at the very least, of private firms doing more than they are required to do under 
applicable laws and regulations governing the environment, worker safety and health, and 
investments in the communities in which they operate” (p. 261). This definition has the 
advantage of clearly distinguishing between CSR activities and compliance activities. For 
example, if a polluting firm invests in a single device to bring its emissions to some 
required level, it is only choosing to improve the environment as a reaction to 
governmental regulation. However, if the same firm decides to create an action plan to 
further reduce its emissions over several years, then the firm would be engaging in CSR 
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by going beyond regulatory compliance to improve the environment over a consistent 
timeframe. 
This study uses data for CSR transparency from the Roberts Environmental 
Center (REC) at Claremont McKenna College (CMC). The REC creates a Pacific 
Sustainability Index (PSI 3.00) and uses this measure to rank firms within an industry on 
their CSR efforts as reported on their websites and/or formal CSR reports. Since the 
REC‟s methodology uses only information reported directly by the firm, it provides a 
useful measure of firm transparency. However, since a firm voluntarily reports CSR 
activities, it can be subject to misreporting that can potentially inflate a firm‟s score. 
Specifically, I use data collected by the REC for the years 2009-2012 to create an 
environmental intent score for each firm. The environmental intent score is comparable 
across the various sectors. 
I find that being dependent on investors, being a final good producer, having an 
international presence, and having a larger number of polluting facilities all contribute 
significantly to an increased level of environmental transparency. These results show that 
various stakeholder pressures do influence a firm into adopting voluntary environmental 
and transparency initiatives. In addition, I find that having more onsite emissions 
contributes to the level of transparency, but total emissions and offsite emissions do not. 
This result suggests that firms that pollute heavily onsite may attempt to skew the 
public‟s perception by providing detailed transparency information. This motivation does 
not seem present for those firms that transfer a large quantity of emissions offsite.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous 
literature, with specific emphasis on the determinants of a firm engaging in CSR and 
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other voluntary initiatives. I explain my data in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical framework and results. Last, I offer some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 A primary focus of the empirical CSR literature to date is examining the factors 
that influence a firm to engage in CSR activities. There have been many arguments for 
and against CSR since Friedman (1970) published his seminal critique, which argued that 
CSR is incompatible with the main goals of firms since their primary responsibility 
should be to increase profits. This argument stems from the idea that a firm‟s sole 
responsibility is to increase its profits, and any activities that do not contribute to this goal 
are irresponsible on the part of the firm. However, recent literature shows that CSR does 
increase the competiveness of a firm, which provides an incentive for firms to begin 
incorporating CSR into the firm‟s values and goals (Vilanova et al. 2009).  
Moreover, Heslin and Ochoa (2008) identify five main motivations for a firm to 
adopt CSR practices. First, CSR can lead to growth in the market share for a firm, 
meaning that CSR can lead to increased sales. One channel through which this can occur 
is the use of CSR as a marketing tool to please current customers and help bring in new 
customers (Portney 2008). This aligns with current research suggesting that some 
consumers may be willing to pay significantly more for socially responsible goods 
(Jensen et al. 2003). One way for a firm to increase profits is by trying to market a 
product as superior to its competitors. Therefore, CSR may provide a sales advantage 
over firms that do not engage in CSR. 
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Second, CSR provides the opportunity for organizational learning from engaging 
in projects that increase a firm‟s core competencies (Heslin and Ochoa 2008). Because 
CSR activities can include a broad range of activities and initiatives, each firm is free to 
choose those activities that best align with the firm‟s organizational structure, production 
processes, goals, etc. By focusing its CSR activities in an area of core competency, the 
firm can potentially benefit from previously unexplored techniques. For example, Porter 
and van der Linde (1995) find that firms that attempt to reduce pollution become more 
efficient in other activities, which reduces costs. 
Third, CSR can increase employee commitment and engagement for a firm 
(Heslin and Ochoa 2008). Firms engaging in CSR are more attractive for employees since 
CSR values extend internally, leading to a highly desirable work environment. Brekke 
and Nyborg (2004) show that firms engaging in CSR experience gains from labor-market 
screening. That is, firms engaged in CSR will be in high demand for individuals 
searching for employment, which results in these firms having an advantage for acquiring 
the best talent. Since engaging in CSR contributes to a positive work environment, it also 
increases productivity for current employees (Portney 2008). The benefits from talent 
acquisition and increased productivity are both reasons why a firm may begin CSR 
initiatives. 
Fourth, pressures from external stakeholders can drive CSR since it may be 
interpreted as a signal of the trustworthiness of a firm (Heslin and Ochoa 2008). A 
positive view of the firm by external stakeholders is helpful when the firm attempts to 
embark on a new project or has legal troubles, which can be exemplified by the cases of 
Enron and BP (Portney 2008). Before the release of reports detailing high-level corporate 
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misconduct, Enron‟s public condemnation was slowed because of its history of corporate 
philanthropy (Portney 2008). In contrast, BP‟s history of ignoring stakeholders led to 
huge costs in 2007 for violating pollution regulations, since the public was quicker to 
criticize (Heslin and Ochoa 2008). These two examples show how having a favorable 
image as a result of CSR can reduce costs associated with legal disputes. 
Lastly, CSR performance can lead to improved relations with financial analysts 
and investors (Heslin and Ochoa 2008). This increase results because donating to a 
socially responsible firm can lead to benefits associated with a standard charitable 
donation, such as tax write-offs, and increased utility to the investor. Recent literature 
theorizes that a firm‟s value would be lower if it did not engage in CSR initiatives (Zivin 
and Small 2005: Baron 2009).
1
 The personal values of an investor are important since 
they play a role in which firms are chosen as a good investment. The previous theories 
have the underlying assumption that investors care about social welfare, and recent data 
shows that socially responsible investing is becoming more prominent (Portney 2008). 
This increase in socially responsible investing may provide a motive for firms to increase 
their CSR in order to attract more investors. 
All of these determinants of CSR have the same aim: to improve a firm‟s bottom 
line in order to increase competitiveness (Portney 2008). While CSR activities may be 
welfare-enhancing, there is some evidence of firms engaging in forms of CSR that benefit 
the firm but not society. First, a firm that is generally on the defensive about an issue 
                                                          
1
 Zivin and Small (2005) develop a model in which investors receive utility from consumption and 
donations. The model shows that when a firm changes policies to include CSR, the investor receives utility. 
In addition, if a large amount of investors have strong preferences for philanthropy, having social policies 
may maximize firm valuations. Baron (2009) also provides a model where consumers and investors receive 
utility from buying products or investing in firms, respectively. 
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might engage in CSR to deflect attention away from the actual problem (Portney 2008). 
In other words, a firm may use CSR in order to overshadow any bad publicity with some 
good publicity. Similarly, a firm may attempt to “greenwash” its public image by 
increasing its CSR transparency without comparable increases in the amount of effort 
used in CSR initiatives. Bazillier and Vauday (2010) find that “light greenwahsing” may 
be a credible strategy for certain firms based on empirical evidence. 
These issues that result from CSR transparency demonstrate that studying the 
determinants of a firm initially engaging in CSR may not be an adequate representation 
of the extent of CSR actions in a firm. Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) show that 
pressures from liability threats and pressures from consumers, investors, and external 
stakeholders play a significant role in the comprehensiveness of a firm‟s environmental 
management system (EMS). An EMS is a voluntary initiative within a firm for self-
regulating pollution and other environmental performance metrics. Since both an EMS 
and CSR are voluntary multi-dimensional programs, the results that determine the 
comprehensiveness of an EMS are likely to be similar to the determinants of the 
extensiveness of a firm‟s CSR transparency. 
 This paper attempts to add to the literature by exploring the factors that 
contribute to the comprehensiveness of a firm‟s CSR transparency. The previous 
literature has focused on the binary decision to adopt a CSR policy or not, but has failed 
to examine the extent to which firm characteristics explain differences in the level of 
CSR a firm chooses to adopt. 
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III. Data 
 I use data from three sources, the Roberts Environmental Center (REC) at 
Claremont McKenna College (CMC), Standard & Poor‟s Compustat North America, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These data sources are ideal for my 
purposes as they include detailed information on environmental transparency (REC), 
financial characteristics (Compustat), and environmental exposure (EPA). I discuss each 
in turn. 
The REC produces annual reports for various sectors (i.e., industries) 
characterizing the CSR efforts of the firms analyzed. Recent sector reports include the 
largest firms in each sector, up to 30 firms, based on Fortune 500 and 1000 rankings. Past 
reports include all firms that are ranked on the Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 lists, and 
this number could exceed thirty firms. For each firm, the REC reports a score based on its 
Pacific Sustainability Index (PSI). The PSI is a comprehensive measure accounting for 
several aspects of CSR. Specifically, a firm‟s overall PSI score is a combination of sub-
scores in the following six content areas: environmental intent, environmental reporting, 
environmental performance, social intent, social reporting, and social performance. 
Information is collected by student analysts who award points for specific questions in 
each content area based on information available through the firm‟s website. As such, 
PSI scores are based on the CSR image of the firm as projected from its website.  
My analysis examines the firm characteristics that contribute to differences in a 
measure of environmental intent based on information from the REC reports. I focus on 
the environmental intent content area rather than the more comprehensive PSI score 
because inconsistencies across sector reports complicate a cross-industry analysis using 
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PSI scores. That is, PSI scores are not comparable across sector reports. Similar 
inconsistencies would arise if I instead focused on other content areas such as 
environmental reporting, social reporting, and social intent. The content areas focusing on 
environmental and social performance examine changes in the firm‟s performance since 
the previous time the firm was included in a report. While an interesting issue, exploring 
dynamic aspects of CSR is beyond the scope of my analysis. Thus, environmental intent 
provides the most appropriate measure of transparency and minimizes challenges 
associated with inconsistencies across sector reports. 
To create the measure of environmental intent used in my analysis, which I refer 
to as EI Score, I collect information from various sector reports produced by the REC for 
the years 2009-2012.
2
 In choosing reports for inclusion in my study, I focus on sectors 
that were likely to include publicly traded firms for whom I could readily access financial 
information and those with a domestic presence that would likely be subject to U.S. 
environmental regulations.
3 
 
I focus attention on the information that the REC reports use to create the reported 
score for environmental intent content area, which I refer to as the REC EI Score. The 
REC EI Score is the percentage of the total points possible that can be awarded based on 
responses for specific questions in the environmental intent content area. Some of the 
REC reports included in my analysis contain sector-specific questions in the 
environmental intent content area. Thus, the REC EI Scores are not comparable across 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix Table 1 for a list of reports used in the study. 
3
 Excluded reports include New York Public Companies (2009), Entertainment (2009), China‟s Largest 
(2009), Pharmaceuticals (2009), Liberal Arts Colleges (2010), Airline (2010), U.S. Universities (2011), 
U.S. Cities (2011), Government Agencies (2011), U.S Universities (2012), and Global Capital Goods 
(2012). 
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industries. In order for my measure, EI Score, to be consistent across industries, it is 
created using only those questions in the environmental intent content area that are 
common across sector reports. This standardization involved deleting any unique sector-
specific questions.
4
 Table 1 shows the thirteen questions that are standard across all 
industries and are used to calculate EI Score. 
Each question has a maximum of two points where one point indicates a 
discussion of intentions, visions, or plans, and one point is awarded for specific evidence 
of implementation. Therefore, EI Score is the percentage, ranging from 0 to 100, of 
points awarded out of a total of twenty-six possible points (i.e., a maximum of two points 
for each of the 13 questions). The fact that there are two points for each question is 
important since it reduces the ability of the firm to engage in greenwashing. If a firm is 
transparent in stating its intentions, visions, or plans but does not provide specific 
evidence of implementation, a firm can only receive discussion points, theoretically. This 
means that the maximum EI Score a greenwashing firm can receive is 50 (i.e., 13/26). 
This is not meant to say that a firm that scores 50 or below must be attempting to 
greenwash the public, but that the methodology of calculating the EI Score does not 
allow a greenwashing firm to score 100 (i.e., 26/26). This EI Score is used to create the 
dependent variable EI SCORE, which has a mean of 55.52 and a standard deviation of 
26.75. 
                                                          
4
 Because of the standardization process, only some of the standardized EI Scores differ from REC EI 
Scores. The reports in which EI Score differs from REC EI Score include: Consumer Food, Food 
Production, and Beverages (2009), Chemicals (2009), Consumer Food, Food Production, and Beverages 
(2011), General Merchandisers (2011), Household, Apparel, and Personal Products (2012), and Chemicals 
(2012). 
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 Data for firm financial characteristics are from Standard & Poor‟s Compustat 
North America dataset accessed from the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). 
Compustat provides fundamentals and market information for publically held North 
American firms. I collected data for onsite and offsite emissions from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) using the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) tool. The Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986 and the Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990 mandate the EPA to collect data regarding toxic releases and 
transfers of specific chemicals annually. 
Table 2 includes definitions and summary statistics for each variable collected 
from the various data sources. All variables measured in dollars are adjusted for inflation 
using the Consumer Price Index with a base year of 2011. In addition, continuous 
variables are lagged five years because I argue it takes time for a firm to respond to 
pressures from stakeholders, and an EI Score today is likely the result of these past 
pressures. 
 As mentioned earlier, firms may have incentives to become more environmentally 
transparent because of pressures from consumers, investors, the local community, and 
other stakeholders. The explanatory variables I include in my analysis proxy for these 
pressures. Specifically, firms whose production processes are highly polluting may feel 
increased pressure from the general community regarding their emissions. In this case, a 
highly polluting firm may benefit more from informing the public of its environmental 
record by making information transparent and accessible. All emissions variables are 
measured in thousands of pounds. ONSITE emissions are direct discharges from a 
facility into the surrounding area, while OFFSITE emissions are transferred from the 
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facility and eventually released elsewhere. These variables have means of 4,284.84 and 
1,251.56 with standard deviations of 14,778.23 and 7,045.10, respectively. TOTAL 
RELEASES measures the total quantity of ONSITE and OFFSITE emissions produced 
by a firm based on the TRI data. TOTAL RELEASES has a mean value of 5,536.40 with 
a large standard deviation of 16,411.91. To allow for possible nonlinear effects of the 
returns to transparency, I also include the square of TOTAL RELEASES in the model. 
 The size of the firm, specifically the number of facilities it owns, might have an 
effect on the level of environmental transparency the firm adopts. The more polluting 
facilities a firm has, the more communities the firm‟s production activities may impact, 
thus creating a larger pool of stakeholders. The variable FACILITIES measures the 
number of facilities the firm owns that are subject to the reporting requirements of the 
TRI. The mean number of FACILITIES is 14.02 with a standard deviation of 15.79. In 
addition, to serve as a control for firm size with regards to emissions, the average 
emissions per facility (TOTAL RELEASES/FACILITIES) and emissions per sales dollar 
(TOTAL RELEASES/SALES) are included in the model. These variables have means of 
416.74 and 724.24 with standard deviations of 1,468.47 and 2,354.28, respectively. 
 Even with the pressures faced from stakeholders, a firm needs to be able to 
respond to these pressures adequately. How adequately a firm is able to respond can be 
equated to the level of innovation of a firm. R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D 
expenditures per unit of sales, which proxies for the level of innovation. R&D/SALES 
has a mean of 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.03. If a firm is pressured to adopt CSR 
initiatives, how quickly and effectively it responds will be dependent on its level of 
efficiency and innovation. Thus, a firm with a high R&D/SALES ratio should be more 
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effective at changing policies than a firm with a with a lower R&D/SALES ratio, which 
should result in a higher EI SCORE. 
 To appear less risky to investors, a firm may have an incentive to become more 
environmentally transparent, which allows investors to track and monitor a firm‟s 
environmental performance. In addition, firms that are largely dependent on the capital 
market are likely to have increased environmental transparency. The firm‟s sales-to-asset 
ratio (SALES/ASSET) serves as a proxy for the degree to which a firm depends on 
capital markets. The mean and standard deviation for SALES/ASSET are 1.27 and 0.86, 
respectively. This ratio measures a firm‟s efficiency in managing its assets. A firm with a 
smaller sales-to-asset ratio requires a larger investment to generate sales revenue, and is 
thus more dependent on capital markets. If firms that are highly dependent on the capital 
market are more transparent, then they may have higher values of EI SCORE, all else 
equal. 
 Firms that produce final goods sell products directly to the consumer, as opposed 
to firms that sell intermediate products and have little direct contact with the end use 
consumer. Because of this relationship, firms that produce final goods may be more 
likely to feel pressure from consumers and may be more likely to increase their 
environmental transparency in response to such pressures. I follow the procedure used in 
Harrington and Khanna (2008), which uses 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes, to create the dummy variable FINAL GOOD, which has a mean of 0.41 and 
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a standard deviation of 0.49. Firms that are classified as final good producers are given a 
value of one and all other firms are given a value of zero.
5
   
 Firms that are competitive abroad may face different pressures than those with 
only a domestic presence. A firm with an international presence has to compete with 
different firms and appeal to different types of consumers. If preferences for 
environmental quality are stronger abroad than they are domestically, then having an 
international presence may encourage a firm to increase its environmental transparency. 
Compustat North America characterizes firms as domestic, international, or both. By 
assigning a value of one to firms denoted as international or both, and zero to domestic 
firms, I created the dummy variable INTERNATIONAL, which has a mean of 0.24 and a 
standard deviation of 0.43. Finally, to control for any factors common to firms within 
particular industries that influence EI Score, I include industry fixed effects based on 2-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
6
 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis and Results  
 Before turning to a formal econometric analysis, I present the results of difference 
of means tests to provide some suggestive evidence on the relationship between EI 
SCORE and various firm characteristics. For continuous variables, I calculate the mean 
EI SCORE at the 25th and 75th percentile. For binary variables, I compute the mean EI 
SCORE for each value of the binary variable, 0 and 1. Table 3 reports these means and 
                                                          
5
 SIC codes categorized as final goods: 2000, 2030, 2040, 2060, 2080, 2082, 2085, 2090, 2111, 2250, 2253, 
2511, 2531, 2621, 2731, 2750, 2771, 2820, 2834, 2840, 2842, 2844, 2851, 2870, 2911, 3011, 3089, 3420, 
3430, 3523, 3570, 3571, 3577, 3579, 3630, 3640, 3651, 3661, 3711, 3721, 3841, 3842, 3845, 3861, 3911, 
3942, 3944, 3949, 4100, 4813, 4833, 4922, 4953, 5000, 5013, 5094, 5110, 5141, 5160, 5172, 5200, 5331, 
5411, 5651, 5661, 5731, 5990, 6159,6331, 7011, 7200, 7370, 7372, 7373, 7510, 8721, 9997. 
6
 See Appendix Table 2 for the creation of industry fixed effects using 2-digit SIC codes.  
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their differences as well as p-values that indicate whether these differences are 
significant. The results suggest that differences in the mean EI SCOREs for ONSITE, 
OFFSITE, TOTAL RELEASES, FACILITES, TOTAL RELEASES/FACILITIES, 
SALES/ASSET, and INTERNATIONAL are statistically significant. For example, the 
75
TH
 percentiles of TOTAL RELEASES and FACILITES have mean EI SCOREs that 
are 15.6 and 17.8 points higher than the mean EI SCOREs of the 25
th
 percentiles, 
respectively. Also, the mean EI SCORE for international firms is 17.9 points higher than 
the mean EI SCORE for domestic firms. While informative as they help to identify some 
firm characteristics that may help to explain differences in EI SCOREs across firms, the 
difference of means tests are limited in that they fail to isolate the influence of particular 
factors while holding constant the effects of others. A formal econometric model does not 
suffer from this limitation. 
 Following Anton et al. (2004)
7
, I estimate the following empirical model: 
(1) 

EI SCORE it 0 Dit Xit5  it  
where EI SCORE represents the EI Score for firm i in reporting year t, D represents a 
vector of firm characteristics that are binary (FINAL GOOD, INTERNATIONAL, 
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS), X represents a vector of firm characteristics that are 
continuous (R&D/SALES, SALES/ASSET, FACILITIES), and ε is an error term with 
the usual properties. 
 I estimate three specifications. Specification 1, the primary specification, follows 
specifications adopted in the literature and adds to equation (1) by also including TOTAL 
RELEASES and its square. Specification 2 is identical to Specification 1 but also 
                                                          
7
 Anton et al. (2004) investigated the determinants of the comprehensiveness of a firm‟s environmental 
management system (EMS). 
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includes industry fixed effects. While not of independent interest, the industry fixed 
effects can represent important controls in the analysis. Specification 3 is identical to 
Specification 1 except it replaces TOTAL RELEASES and its square with two emissions 
variables to distinguish between ONSITE and OFFSITE releases. This is attempting to 
see if there is any difference in having more ONSITE emissions versus OFFSITE 
emissions. It is important to take a look at these variables separately since ONSITE 
emissions occur at the facility and are more easily attributed to the firm. Specifications 4 
and 5 attempt to take emissions relative to firm size into account by replacing TOTAL 
RELEASES and its square with TOTAL RELEASES/SALES and TOTAL 
RELEASES/FACILITIES, respectively (the latter specification also excludes 
FACILITIES in levels given it is included in the denominator of the ratio of TOTAL 
RELEASES/FACILITIES). 
 Table 4 presents the results.
8
 The estimated coefficients on the first four variables 
included in Table 4 are consistent across all five specifications. The estimated coefficient 
on SALES/ASSET suggests lower EI SCORES among firms with higher SALES/ASSET 
ratios. A one unit increase in the SALES/ASSET ratio reduces EI SCORE by between 5.3 
and 7.4 points depending upon the specification. A SALES/ASSET ratio of 1 means that 
a firm has an equivalent amount of net sales revenue to cover the costs of its assets. A 
higher SALES/ASSET ratio means that the firm is less reliant on investors since the firm 
will have more net sales revenue to cover the value of the assets. Thus, the negative and 
significant coefficient on this variable is consistent with expectations, based on Heslin 
and Ochoa (2008). The estimated coefficient on FINAL GOOD suggests that, relative to 
                                                          
8
 Appendix Table 3 looks at the same specifications with non-lagged variables, and the results are not 
qualitatively different from Table 4. 
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producing an intermediate produce, producing a final good increases EI SCORE by 
between 7.4 and 12 points. Being a FINAL GOOD producer means that a firm directly 
sells a good or service to the consumer, which makes consumers the firm‟s biggest 
stakeholder. This follows the intuition suggested by Portney (2008) that public pressures 
from direct consumers can significantly pressure a firm, and in this case, result in a 
higher level of environmental transparency. 
 The estimated coefficient on INTERNATIONAL suggests that, relative to solely 
domestic firms, being involved internationally increases EI SCORE between 16.6 and 
17.1 points. This follows the expectation that having an international presence provides 
different pressures than being only involved domestically, and these pressures would 
result in a greater degree of environmental transparency. First, being involved 
internationally involves increased competition with the increased number of international 
firms. These firms may be more transparent than domestic firms for various reasons, and 
in order to keep being competitive, increasing transparency might be necessary. Second, 
international consumers might have different values than domestic consumers. If 
consumers in other countries value environmental initiatives more, it makes sense that 
international firms might feel pressured to become more transparent. Finally, 
international firms may be subject to different legal requirements regarding 
environmental transparency, which would cause them to have a higher level than a 
similar domestic firm. 
 The estimated coefficient on FACILITIES suggests an increase in EI Score of 
between 0.4 and 0.5 points from each additional facility. This is consistent with Heslin 
and Ochoa‟s (2008) argument that firms with a larger number of polluting facilities will 
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need to increase their environmental transparency since they will have a larger number of 
external stakeholders. Also, it may be easier for a larger firm to become more transparent 
because of higher levels of efficiency. In addition, larger firms may have a larger pool of 
stakeholders from the various communities in which their facilities operate, resulting in a 
greater pressure for transparency. The results of Specification 2 suggest that while the 
industry fixed effects are jointly significant, their inclusion does not substantially change 
the results. The inclusion of the industry fixed effects is, however, important since 
various industries have different pressures that may contribute to the overall level of 
environmental transparency adopted by firms within each industry. For example, firms in 
the chemical industry are likely to face different pressures than firms in the retail 
industry, and therefore will have different factors contributing to their respective levels of 
environment transparency. 
 The estimated coefficient on R&D/SALES is not statistically significant. This is 
inconsistent with the finding of Anton et al. (2004), of a more comprehensive EMS 
among firms with higher values of R&D/SALES. Two factors may explain the divergent 
results. First, innovation could have a differential impact on the incentives to adopt a 
more comprehensive EMS than on those to be more environmentally transparent. Second, 
the variable R&D/SALES could be a poor proxy for innovation. In theory, it should be 
easier for a firm with a high level of innovation to have a higher level of transparency. 
However, this insignificance may stem from the fact that CSR initiatives are adopted over 
time. Having a high level of innovation might be important when initially implementing 
CSR initiatives throughout the firm, but this may subside over time. In addition, using 
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R&D may actually be capturing some element of firm size, rather than innovation as 
intended (i.e., larger firms can afford to engage in R&D over smaller firms).  
 Finally, the only environmental variable that has a significant effect on EI 
SCORE is ONSITE releases, which has an estimated coefficient of 0.2 for every one 
million pounds of toxic emissions. The other emissions variables, TOTAL RELEASES, 
and OFFSITE, do not have statistically significant coefficients. In addition, the variables 
that attempt to control for firm size, TOTAL RELEASES/SALES and TOTAL 
RELEASES/FACILITIES, do no have statistically significant coefficients. This does not 
follow the expectation that firms releasing excessive amounts of total pollutants would 
benefit from higher levels of environmental transparency. These results suggest that only 
firms with extremely high levels of direct pollution from their facilities increase their 
transparency. Therefore, since onsite releases can be directly traced to the firm, this 
increased transparency may actually be an attempt at greenwashing, which is consistent 
with Portney (2008), who explains that a firm might engage in CSR to draw attention 
away from other problems. 
   
V. Conclusions 
 CSR represents a growing aspect of many corporations operations, and 
subsequently sparks a lot of discussion as to what would motivate a firm to conduct 
certain activities. The previous literature has focused on why a firm would engage in 
voluntary CSR, but no existing study focuses on why a firm would adopt various levels 
of transparency when voluntarily reporting CSR activities. This study utilizes a measure 
for environmental transparency provided by the Roberts Environmental Center (REC) at 
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Claremont McKenna to see if firm and environmental characteristics, collected from 
Compustat North America and the Environmental Protection Agency, are determinants of 
this measure. The econometric results show that the determinants of environmental 
transparency are largely consistent with what pressures a firm into CSR in the first place. 
These results show that various stakeholder pressures, such as consumers, investors, and 
the general community, push firms into adopting various voluntary initiatives.  
 The results also suggest that firms may be involved in aspects of greenwashing. 
This is consistent with the findings that overall total toxic releases do not contribute to 
the level of environmental transparency, but onsite toxic releases do. Firms are well 
aware that onsite emissions are most easily attributed to them. Thus, the firm can respond 
in two possible scenarios: creating an increased level of transparency to please the public 
or transferring emissions offsite. The latter is evident in some firms by the fact that 
increased offsite emissions do not significantly affect the overall level of transparency. 
 Using REC reports and matching data with Compustat and the EPA resulted in a 
lower than anticipated number of observations. Ideally, it would have been better to have 
a measure for environmental transparency that encompassed more firms so more 
observations could have been utilized in the econometric analysis. This would also 
increase the relevance of the empirical findings to a more diverse set of industries. 
 It will be interesting to see what future studies regarding CSR and transparency 
reveal. First, a study should examine if these results are comparable using a different 
measure of environmental transparency. In addition, another study should compare 
various aspects of CSR transparency and see if there are any differences in the 
determinants. For example, whether or not there are significant differences in the 
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determinants of environmental transparency, social transparency, and overall CSR 
transparency.  
 Finally, it will be interesting to see what future legislation regarding firm 
responsibility takes place. It seems that most firms have specific market pressures that 
initiate CSR and transparency efforts. It would be worthwhile to analyze whether CSR in 
countries where it is mandated is as effective as CSR in countries with no formal 
legislation.
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Tables 
TABLE 1—PSI QUESTIONS AND TOPICS USED TO STANDARDIZE THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL INTENT SCORE 
PSI ID #  Question Topic 
4 
5 
6 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
16 
19 
20 
21 
 23 
Report contact person 
Environmental visionary statement 
Environmental impediments and challenges 
Environmental policy statement 
Climate change/global warming 
Habitat/ecosystem conservation 
Biodiversity 
Green purchasing 
Environmental education 
Environmental management structure 
Environmental management system 
Environmental accounting 
Stakeholder consultation 
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TABLE 2—DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Mean 
 
Std. dev. 
EI SCORE Score of environmental 
transparency 
55.52 26.75 
Independent    
Variables Description Mean Std. dev. 
ONSITEt-5 Onsite discharges of toxic 
emissions („000 pounds) 
 
4,284.84 14,778.23 
OFFSITEt-5 Offsite transfers of toxic 
emissions („000 pounds) 
 
1,251.56 7,045.10 
TOTAL RELEASESt-5 Total toxic emissions (onsite + 
offsite) („000 pounds) 
 
5,536.40 16,411.91 
 
FACILITIESt-5 
 
Number of facilities with toxic 
emissions 
 
14.02 15.79 
TOTAL RELEASES/ FACILITIESt-5 
 
Average total toxic emissions 
per facility 
 
416.74 1,468.47 
TOTAL RELEASES/SALESt-5 Total toxic emissions-sales ratio 
(pounds per dollar) 
 
724.24 2,354.28 
 
R&D/SALESt-5 
  
 
R&D expenditures-sales ratio 0.02 0.03 
SALES/ASSETt-5 
 
 
Sales-total assets ratio 
 
1.27 0.86 
FINAL GOOD Dummy ( = 1 if firms sell final 
goods; = 0 otherwise) 
 
0.41 0.49 
INTERNATIONAL 
 
Dummy ( = 1 if firms active 
abroad; = 0 otherwise) 
0.24 0.43 
N = 177 
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TABLE 3—DIFFERENCES IN THE MEAN EI SCORE FOR THE TOP AND BOTTOM 
PERCENTILES OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Continuous Percentile  
Variables 25 75 Difference 
ONSITEt-5 45.56 63.50 -17.95*** 
(0.00) 
OFFSITEt-5 46.92 57.09 -10.17** 
(0.05) 
TOTAL RELEASESt-5 46.67 62.31 -15.64*** 
(0.00) 
FACILITIESt-5 44.00 61.81 -17.81*** 
(0.00) 
TOTAL RELEASES/ FACILITIESt-5 
 
48.03 58.55 -10.51* 
(0.07) 
TOTAL RELEASES/SALESt-5 
 
52.05 53.08 -1.03 
(0.85) 
R&D/SALESt-5 
 
53.79 61.97 -8.27 
(0.12) 
SALES/ASSETt-5 
 
63.81 52.53 11.28** 
(0.04) 
Binary Value  
Variables 0 1 Difference 
FINAL GOOD 
 
53.04 59.13 -6.09 
(0.14) 
INTERNATIONAL 
 
51.18 69.05 -17.88*** 
(0.00) 
N=177 
P-values are in parentheses 
All values rounded to two decimal places 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; 
***statistically significant at the 1% level 
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TABLE 4—DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPARENCY SPECIFICATIONS 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D/SALESt-5 -82.99 
(66.36) 
-42.81 
(80.80) 
-81.71 
(66.11) 
-93.60 
(64.45) 
-73.01 
(69.07) 
SALES/ASSETt-5 -7.16*** 
(1.80) 
-5.35*** 
(1.98) 
-6.56*** 
(1.85) 
-7.43*** 
(1.75) 
-6.82*** 
(2.03) 
FINAL GOOD 8.60** 
(4.02) 
12.00*** 
(4.35) 
8.53** 
(3.89) 
8.11** 
(3.92) 
7.39* 
(3.99) 
INTERNATIONAL 
 
16.95*** 
(4.80) 
16.66*** 
(4.87) 
16.58*** 
(4.64) 
17.14*** 
(4.72) 
17.12*** 
(4.98) 
FACILITIESt-5 
 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.50*** 
(0.11) 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
 
TOTAL RELEASESt-5/1000 -0.09 
(0.43) 
-0.21 
(0.35) 
   
TOTAL RELEASESt-5/1000 (Square) 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
   
ONSITEt-5/1000  
 
 0.19** 
(0.10) 
  
OFFSITEt-5/1000  
 
 -0.38 
(0.24) 
  
TOTAL RELEASES/SALESt-5  
 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
 
TOTAL RELEASES/FACILITIESt-5 
 
    0.00 
(0.00) 
INTERCEPT 53.12*** 
(4.07) 
56.70*** 
(9.12) 
52.55*** 
(4.06) 
53.86*** 
(4.08) 
58.33*** 
(3.83) 
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS NO YES*** NO NO NO 
R
2 
0.197 0.248 0.214 0.195 0.138 
N = 177 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
All values rounded to two decimal places 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; 
***statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix 
APPENDIX TABLE 1—ROBERTS ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER (REC) 
REPORTS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Year Industry 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2011 
2011 
2011 
2012 
2012 
2012 
Consumer Durables and Motor Vehicles 
Forest and Paper Products 
Consumer Food, Food Production, and Beverages 
Utilities, Gas, and Electric 
Energy and Utilities 
Capital Goods - Industrial and Farm Equipment 
Chemicals 
Aerospace and Defense 
Mining, Crude Oil, and Oil Production 
Petroleum Refining 
Metals 
Consumer Food, Food Production, and Beverages 
General Merchandisers 
Energy and Utilities 
Consumer Durables and Motor Vehicles 
Household, Apparel, and Personal Products 
Chemicals 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2—CREATION OF INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS 
Industry 2-digit SIC 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Hunting 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
 
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate 
Service Industries 
 
Auxiliaries 
01, 02, 07, 08, 09 
10, 12, 13 ,14 
15,16,17 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 
40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 
50, 51 
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 
60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67 
70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 
87, 89 
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99 
Source: United States Census Bureau 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3—DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPARENCY 
SPECIFICATIONS (NON-LAGGED) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D/SALESt 41.89 
(88.46) 
102.13 
(99.70) 
27.46 
(91.00) 
29.99 
(88.57) 
34.93 
(92.77) 
SALES/ASSETt -9.31*** 
(3.27) 
-5.83 
(4.00) 
-9.47*** 
(3.21) 
-9.61*** 
(3.22) 
-8.33** 
(3.55) 
FINAL GOOD 7.27* 
(3.80) 
10.42** 
(4.18) 
6.77* 
(3.77) 
7.05* 
(3.75) 
6.56* 
(3.87) 
INTERNATIONAL 
 
13.08*** 
(4.33) 
14.11*** 
(4.46) 
13.26*** 
(4.37) 
13.85*** 
(4.35) 
13.90*** 
(4.48) 
FACILITIESt-5 
 
0.41*** 
(0.13) 
0.48*** 
(0.13) 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.42*** 
(0.10) 
 
TOTAL RELEASESt/1000 -0.02 
(0.41) 
-0.19 
(0.37) 
   
TOTAL RELEASESt/1000 (Square) 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
   
ONSITEt/1000  
 
 0.22*** 
(0.06) 
  
OFFSITEt/1000  
 
 -1.79*** 
(0.58) 
  
TOTAL RELEASES/SALESt  
 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
 
TOTAL RELEASES/ FACILITIESt 
 
    0.00** 
(0.00) 
INTERCEPT 53.33*** 
(4.07) 
37.78** 
(15.21) 
54.32*** 
(4.72) 
53.83*** 
(4.80) 
57.61*** 
(4.62) 
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS NO YES*** NO NO NO 
R
2 
0.191 0.232 0.215 0.183 0.135 
N =180 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
All values rounded to two decimal places 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; 
***statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
